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Abstract 
This research explores the core capabilities of the U.S. military as well as of 
non-military organizations through the lens of the disaster response life cycle. 
Disasters and war share several attributes, such as the presence of displaced, 
injured, and vulnerable persons and the need for functioning infrastructure and life 
support through the distribution of emergency supplies and services. Both the U.S. 
military and non-military organizations bring assets, skills, and capabilities to a 
humanitarian crisis; however, the competencies and capacities of each are far from 
homogeneous. Identification of the specific competencies and capabilities that are 
core to the types of organizations bringing logistics and support to a crisis can 
enable better planning by both military and non-military organizations such that 
greater effectiveness and efficiency in the humanitarian response are achieved. 
Keywords: competencies and capabilities, U.S. military, non-governmental 
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I. Introduction 
In recent years there have been approximately 400 disasters affecting 150–
200 million people, resulting in damages of US$20 billion (Vos, Rodriguez, Below, & 
Guha-Sapir, 2010).  As the number of reported disasters increases over time, it is 
worth identifying those capabilities that are both necessary and unique with respect 
to humanitarian and disaster response operations.  In the past, the responses by 
non-military organizations (NMOs)1 and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to 
disasters have been described as ineffective and inadequate (Thomas & Kopczac, 
2005), particularly in the immediate response phase that involves coordinating 
supply and uncertain demand.  Some of the problems experienced may lie in the 
fact that in the immediate hours following a disaster, the availability of resources and 
supplies may not be known (Tomasini & Van Wassenhove, 2009).  
Recently, the United States Department of Defense (U.S. DoD) identified 
humanitarian assistance and disaster response (HADR) as a key mission in 
promoting security around the world (DoD, 2012; DoN, 2007).  As a result, the U.S. 
military—Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps—has begun to shape its training 
and force structures to improve its effectiveness in conducting what were once 
considered only collateral, extraordinary, or special missions.  As a part of improving 
the effectiveness of operations, the military—like NMOs and NGOs—is making 
changes to its operating procedures to improve intra- and inter-organizational 
cooperation.  
Response to a sudden-onset humanitarian crisis often involves a request for 
the military to deliver critical materiel and services to enable, augment, or expand 
the scope of assistance rendered by NMOs and NGOs (Apte & Heath, 2011).  On 
January 12, 2010, a 7.0-magnitude earthquake struck Haiti. The U.S. Coast Guard 
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(USCG) cutter Forward was diverted from its patrolling duties in the Caribbean to 
Port-au-Prince, and USCG helicopters were also deployed.  The Forward arrived 
within 17 hours of the disaster and provided some of the first images and reports of 
the devastation in Haiti (Figure 1). Ships, cutters, and aircraft assisted in evacuating 
thousands of injured Haitians and Americans, delivering medical and emergency 
supplies, and beginning the process of restoring the port’s infrastructure. These 
efforts demonstrate how an organization’s assets, competencies, capabilities, 
authorities, and partnerships bring forth a unique ability in humanitarian operations. 
 
Figure 1. Images of the Destruction of the Port at Port-au-Prince, Haiti, 
Captured by the U.S. Coast Guard Cutter Forward in the Aftermath of 
the January 12, 2010, Earthquake  
(Simmins, 2010) 
 
Although the U.S. military has a history of responding to humanitarian crises, 
there are significant areas in which the effectiveness and efficiency of its responses, 
as well as its coordination with NMOs and NGOs, could improve (GAO, 2010). 
Within humanitarian operations literature it has been stated that preparing for a 
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operations (Apte, 2009; Thomas & Mizushima, 2005; Van Wassenhove, 2006).  In 
all disasters, an effective and efficient humanitarian response is found to depend on, 
among other factors, the capabilities and competencies of organizations involved in 
procuring, transporting, and receiving supplies at the affected area (Thomas, 2003).   
Disasters and war share several attributes: the presence of displaced, injured, 
and vulnerable persons and the need for functioning infrastructure and life support, 
including potable water, functioning wastewater facilities, and access to medical 
care. Both the U.S. military and NMOs bring assets, skills, and capabilities to a 
humanitarian crisis; however, the capabilities and capacities of each are far from 
homogeneous.  The unique and sometimes overlapping core capabilities and 
competencies of the U.S. military and NMOs are not well understood in the context 
of HADR.  
Several studies have been conducted and reported in the literature related to 
humanitarian logistics (Alexander, 2003; Apte, 2009; Gibbons, 2007; Marx, 2009; 
Tomasini & Van Wassenhove, 2009; Waugh & Streib, 2006), military logistics 
(Kress, 2002; Lynn, 1994; Prebelič, 2006; Smith, 2007; Van Creveld, 2004), and the 
similarities and differences between the two (Jahre, Jensen, & Listou, 2009; Kovács 
& Tatham, 2009; Pettit & Beresford, 2005).  Specifically relevant to our research in 
this report, Tomasini and Van Wassenhove’s (2009) research discussed capabilities 
and competencies such as information and knowledge management, supply chain 
management, and collaboration and coordination in the context of humanitarian 
organizations and private firms. What have not been identified in the literature are 
those competencies and capabilities that are core to the military and where those 
competencies are critical or most needed during the operational life cycle of a 
humanitarian crisis. Our work builds upon the seminal work by Prahalad and Hamel 
(1990) on the core competency of the corporation.  In this research we outline the 
core capabilities of military forces, in particular the U.S. military, and NMOs with 
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II. Capabilities and Competencies 
The ability of organizations to function efficiently and effectively during 
disaster response operations depends in some part on their ability to identify, 
cultivate, and exploit their core capabilities.  Prahalad and Hamel (1990) introduced 
three tests to identify competencies that are “core” to a commercial firm: the 
capability must not be easy for competitors to imitate, it must be able to be 
leveraged across a wide variety of products or markets, and it must contribute to the 
needs of the final customer or end user (Table 1).   
Table 1. Prahalad and Hamel’s Business Core Competencies 
(Prahalad & Hamel, 1990) 
Business Core Competencies (Prahalad & Hamel, 1990)
Difficult for competitors to imitate
May be leveraged across a variety of products or markets
Contributes to the needs of the final customer or end-user
 
Building on the idea of a core competency, we created three analogous 
criteria to identify those capabilities that may be considered core to organizations 
providing humanitarian assistance in response to disasters.  First, the capability 
should be unique or not met or matched by other organizations responding to the 
disaster or providing assistance. The uniqueness of a capability reduces the chance 
that it will be redundant should other organizations wish to contribute to a particular 
relief effort and make that capability core to their response effort.  If the capability 
provides a public good (Samuelson, 1954), then this, too, would likely make it core 
from an HADR perspective because the private sector is a poor or non-provider of 
such goods (Samuelson, 1954). Second, a core competency should provide 
potential relief to a wide variety of disasters, which we classify based on the speed 
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(Apte, 2009).  Finally, a core competency should make a substantial contribution 
toward the end relief received by the affected population (Table 2). 
Table 2. Humanitarian and Disaster Response Core Competencies 
Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Response Core 
Competencies
It is unique or not matched by other organizations
May be leveraged across a wide variety of disaster types
Contributes toward the relief of the affected population
 
We use the definitions of the criteria described above of HADR core 
competency to identify the relative number and types of competencies typically 
found in military and non-military organizations that are active participants in HADR.  
The military invests in highly specialized equipment to ascertain conditions in 
a potential battle space, to support forcible entry, and to conduct strategic lift of 
materiel. However, the investments in equipment, skills, and knowledge that 
comprise these competencies also have relevance and application in HADR 
operations.  
For example, over the past decade the U.S. Navy (USN) has provided a 
significant amount of effective humanitarian assistance in disasters due to its many 
critical and unique competencies. Amphibious assault and transport deck ships are a 
primary capability for the USN in humanitarian operations because of their 
usefulness in search and rescue efforts, aircraft and landing support, and freshwater 
production, and for their berthing capacity and medical support facilities (Apte, Yoho, 
Greenfield, & Ingram, 2012; Greenfield & Ingram, 2011). The USN is in the process 
of augmenting Maritime Prepositioning Squadrons for supporting amphibious 
warfare forces. The USN also has been modifying and modernizing its littoral 
combat ships to provide flexible and modular ships for confronting “irregular” 
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Because war and disaster response have common characteristics, it is only 
natural that the military and some humanitarian organizations share capabilities.  
However, we submit that there are some capabilities that are core to each and that 
may be identified by looking at their internal documents (such as mission or posture 
statements) or at their past performance in operations.  Natural disasters give rise to 
a wide range of needs that may be characterized by both scale and scope.  
Tomasini and Van Wassenhove (2009), Kovács and Spens (2007), and Apte (2009) 
described those activities that are essential to delivering aid to address the needs of 






Information & Knowledge Mgt
Essential Services and Capabilities 
for Disaster Response
 
Figure 2. Essential Services and Capabilities for Disaster Response 
The collection, organization, and synthesis of information, as well as its 
transformation into knowledge are necessary for preparing the initial needs 
assessment for a disaster response and for managing the humanitarian efforts of 
that response on a continuous basis. The needs assessment is critical for 
determining the scale and scope of disaster aid that must be delivered to the 
affected area as well as for estimating the local capacity to receive, organize, 
distribute, and manage the aid. We refer to supply generally as those activities 
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support the disaster response. Deployment and distribution refers to the movement 
and distribution of the supplies from their point of origin to their point of consumption. 
Health service support is treated separately from other relief activities because it is 
likely to be the service with the greatest scarcity and demand during the initial stages 
of a disaster response. Finally, collaboration and governance are necessary to 
ensure that the entire relief effort is efficient, effective, and continuous.  We now 
discuss the core capabilities of the U.S. military and NMOs with respect to the 
essential services and capabilities needed to effectively respond to a natural 
disaster.  
A. Information and Knowledge Management 
Information and knowledge management are necessary first to develop an 
understanding of the effects of a natural disaster and then to develop an 
understanding of how to respond effectively to that disaster. Information 
management enables an organization to determine the “who, what, when, where, 
how, and how much” of a disaster. For example, when did the disaster occur? Who 
is affected? What infrastructure and services are no longer functioning? Where is the 
greatest need for disaster aid? How should the disaster response be coordinated 
with local authorities? And, how much relief aid is necessary? These questions are 
not, of course, exhaustive, but they illustrate the types of information that need to be 
collected as well as demonstrate the necessity of synthesizing the answers to these 
questions in order to develop plans that can achieve an effective disaster response.  
Information collection by the military is referred to as intelligence gathering, 
and the military has specific methods and equipment as well as trained staff to 
develop an operational picture of the “battle space.”  Both the military and NGOs are 
largely reliant on news sources, government releases of information, and contacts 
who might happen to be on the ground in the affected region for information in the 
aftermath of a natural disaster. However, the military also has access to satellite and 
aerial reconnaissance assets that are capable of developing a very clear picture of 
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sensing and aerial reconnaissance assets, special operations forces that are 
specially trained to be inserted into adverse environments for the purpose of 
establishing landing zones and collecting intelligence can be deployed to provide an 
accurate description of conditions in specific areas.  
For example, global integrated intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, 
as well as cyberspace superiority are core functions of the U.S. Air Force (USAF). 
The USAF develops, integrates, and operates its cyberspace capabilities for 
supporting missions by continuing work that increases situational awareness while 
securely improving information sharing and data-transport capabilities (Department 
of the Air Force, 2012). The U.S. Army has major programs that form the backbone 
of the tactical network and provide real-time operating pictures in great detail. The 
software-defined family of radios carries data and sound for the benefit of the 
soldiers. Such competencies in information management are critical for humanitarian 
operations. 
The Services’ abilities to gather this type of information is critical for 
assessing needs, but it must still be converted to knowledge and integrated into an 
organization. It is especially important in both the military and NMOs. In the military, 
the rotation of tours makes it necessary to transfer gathered information in order to 
retain this capability. The same can be said about other organizations in which staff 
turnover rates are high and limited resources necessitate the management of 
knowledge.  Knowledge management in terms of lessons learned is also a core 
capability for both the military and NMOs.   
B. Needs Assessment 
Needs assessment is the second essential capability that must be cultivated 
by all the organizations involved in humanitarian operations. However, the first 
critical step in this process is to define what the need is since the way in which the 
military and NGOs describe needs assessment is very different.  The military is more 
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mandate to generate a high-fidelity operational picture of what is happening in the 
area of responsibility.  For the military, the needs assessment involves the fusion of 
all source intelligence that can be collected by humans, electronic sensors, and 
imagery assets to generate situational awareness; the end product is a statement of 
the capabilities that are needed to accomplish a specific mission—a mission that will 
be carefully defined in terms of its duration, scope, and chain of authority.  To the 
extent that the military is able to share information over unclassified systems with 
NMOs and NGOs, the information collected from the military’s unique assets can be 
very valuable for generating higher quality assessments of the needs on the ground.   
In the case of NMOs, and especially NGOs, a needs assessment in the event 
of a disaster tends to be carried out in order to gain awareness of the size of the 
affected population so that calculations can be made to determine the type and 
volume of aid that must be sent to the area and so that a project plan can be 
developed to deliver the aid. For example, the World Food Program (WFP) 
calculates quantities of food to be delivered to various locations based on needs-
assessment surveys that take into account the size and scope of the affected 
population (De Angelis, Mecoli, Nikoi, & Storchi, 2007). The International Federation 
of the Red Cross (IFRC) believes that donor national societies should be involved in 
the needs-assessment phase. Without knowing what is needed, humanitarian 
organizations find themselves in the tough situation of managing donated supplies 
that may not be necessary or suitable for the given disaster (Apte, 2009; Samii, Van 
Wassenhove, Kumar, & Becerra-Fernandez, 2003).   
The needs assessment plays a critical role in the decoupling point of all 
supply chains where the supply chain ceases to be based on a forecast and 
becomes based on a specific customer order (Van Hoek, 1997). In other words, 
similar to agile supply chains in the private sector (Christopher & Towill, 2000), in 
humanitarian response supply chains the decoupling should happen where the “pull” 
of the affected population’s specific need meets the upstream “push” forecasted by 
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is to locate the strategic inventory downstream. However, this suggests that the 
needs assessment (demand forecasted remotely) should be one of the upstream 
activities in a humanitarian response supply chain (Oloruntoba & Gray, 2006), 
whether based within the military or NMO community. Such placement can enhance 
the agility of the supply chain by being responsive to the changing needs of the 
affected population and being able to respond quickly to these changes if the supply 
chain has an effective information infrastructure.  
C. Supply 
The third essential capability shown in Figure 2 is supply. The supply 
capability includes procurement, staging, warehousing, and inventory management. 
For both the military and NMOs, this entails reviewing any pre-staged or pre-
positioned materials and determining their suitability for the particular disaster as 
well as determining how the supplies will be moved from their point of origin to the 
final point of consumption. The military has a core capability in the management of 
large stores of supplies in the case of a contingency as well as in the necessary 
material handling equipment and professionals to move material quickly.   
For example, the U.S. Army provides key support to civil authorities in case of 
a disaster. Its Reserve and National Guard components are a great strength for 
relief efforts during floods, wildfires, and tornados. The National Guard provides a 
distinctive capability for responses to domestic disasters because of its ability to 
procure and distribute emergency supplies and services to the affected areas (Apte 
& Heath, 2011). 
In addition to managing warehoused supplies in preparation for a disaster, 
NGOs must also manage donated supplies. Due to uncertainties of demand and 
supply, donated supplies are as much a blessing as a curse.  Any lack of information 
about specific characteristics of the affected area makes it harder to secure the 
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D. Deployment and Distribution 
The military possesses unique transportation assets that provide essential 
deployment and distribution capabilities during responses to natural disasters. Both 
strategic airlift and sealift capabilities that can roll-on and roll-off equipment, materiel, 
and personnel are available in quantities and within lead-times that very few other 
organizations are capable of delivering.  Large transport aircraft capable of landing 
on short, unimproved airfields, for example, are very important for some types of 
disaster responses.  Ships with shallow drafts or landing craft that can move directly 
from sea to shore without the need for a dock are useful when the ports are 
damaged or too congested to receive the volume of aid that is flowing in from 
external sources (Apte et al., 2012).  And if the airports are incapable  of receiving 
the necessary aid to support the relief effort, the military has the capability to bring 
large numbers of helicopters offshore that can operate independently of support 
from land in order to deliver supplies to specific locations in need.   
For example, helicopter vertical lift is the most highly demanded service 
during disaster response and costs the U.S. DoD the most. During the 2010 floods in 
Pakistan, flight operations represented nearly 80% of the total incremental costs of 
the relief effort (Ures, 2011). However, a military outfit like the U.S. DoD has the 
most capability and sufficient competency to respond within the needed timelines 
since it possesses the only ready fleet of such assets. The NGOs that respond to a 
disaster are typically dependent on contracted or regularly scheduled commercial 
flights to move staff and supplies to affected areas.  
E.  Health Services Support 
Both the military and NMOs work toward the same objective when it comes to 
providing health services: relieving pain and suffering as well as preventing fatalities.  
However, the military possesses hospital ships as well as field hospitals and surgical 
units that are capable of deploying rapidly while managing the logistics of supply and 
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knowledge and mindset helps the military in managing health support services. 
Among these services USN hospital ships have significant upfront costs for 
deployment. For a hospital ship to be deployed, it must serve a symbolic purpose or 
have critical flexibility in medical supplies and services that outweighs its 
uneconomical characteristics. Although an extremely useful capability, a hospital 
ship can prove to be extremely expensive and, therefore, should not be a 
competency to be taken for granted in case of a disaster. 
NGOs, on the other hand, may have to source some medical capabilities from 
many other organizations or from a network of volunteers and then form those 
individuals into teams to provide care because of the diversity of disasters.  In 
addition to providing general medical supplies, specific requirements also have to be 
managed (such as the proper vaccine during a pandemic). 
F. Collaboration and Governance 
Collaboration can be defined as a process in which two or more organizations 
work together to achieve a common goal. Governance, on the other hand, can be 
achieved through command and control, or pre-established logistics networks and 
supply chains. Collaboration is a critical foundation of humanitarian logistics to 
mitigate any kind of disaster (Waugh & Streib, 2006). Response supply chains in a 
humanitarian crisis can be thought of as extreme supply chains that must function at 
high levels of uncertainty and in constantly changing operational environments 
(Hughes, 2009). Therefore, it is necessary for the participants to be skilled and 
adaptable so that they can cope with the situation. Perhaps because of the extreme 
conditions of a disaster situation, military and humanitarian logistics are examples of 
fully flexible supply chains that are even more agile than agile supply chains in the 
private sector (Gattorna, 2009). Both the occurrence of a disaster and the disruption 
it brings to normal living lead to the need for the creation of a complex supply chain 
from scratch. Such a supply chain must be fully flexible for immediate responses. 
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making on the run, hopefully with no regrets (Gattorna, 2006). This type of decision-
making cannot be achieved without collaboration.   
The collaboration scene changed significantly in the NGO community after 
Hurricane Katrina. One of the most important improvements was the establishment 
of the UN cluster approach, which facilitated collaboration among organizations. This 
approach strengthened the humanitarian community’s collaboration structure, and 
through that, the level of collaboration. Eleven clusters, reflecting the global 
humanitarian structure and led by NGOs and UN agencies, were created. The 
change to this cluster approach addresses the gaps in humanitarian response and  
ensures greater predictability, accountability, and partnership. The creation of the 
clusters was the result of the humanitarian response review conducted by the UN in 
2005, which was prompted by the ad hoc and unpredictable nature of responses by 
numerous international agencies in the past. The cluster approach essentially gives 
the international humanitarian community much-needed structure and accountability. 
It enables these organizations to conduct their business professionally and be better 
partners with host governments, authorities, and communities. Examining the past 
experience of the humanitarian supply chain reveals the critical need for 
collaboration and coordination (Tomasini & Van Wassenhove, 2009) not only within 
NGOs but also within the military and private sector (Pettit & Beresford, 2005; Samii 
& Van Wassenhove, 2003; Van Wassenhove, 2006). A significant example of the 
necessary collaboration between the military and NMOs is ensuring the adequate 
transportation and distribution of critical supplies and services and providing the 
security needed to maintain these activities. 
Challenges remain in this NMO–military collaboration in terms of principles 
versus pragmatism. A GAO (2010) report cited U.S. SOUTHCOM as having mature 
interagency processes and coordinating mechanisms in the collaboration area. 
SOUTHCOM’s response to the recent Haiti disaster suggests that there still exist 
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NGOs, and private organizations. These challenges have to be met to improve 
HADR efforts.  
Figure 3 depicts the core capabilities of both the U.S. military and NGOs, and 
matches them to the essential services and capabilities required to effectively 
respond to a natural disaster. This is a mapping of core organizational capabilities to 
essential response capabilities.  
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Figure 3. Humanitarian and Military Core Competencies 
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III. Summary and Conclusion 
In this research we identified those competencies and capabilities that are 
core to the military (specifically the U.S. military) and non-military organizations.  
Further, we hope this work will lead and contribute to a growing body of empirical 
and case study research that explores the role of the military and NMOs in HADR in 
order to facilitate greater understanding within the field of operations management. 
We believe this research cuts across disciplines to include academic scholars, 
policy-makers, and decision-makers in universities, public administration, public 
health, and international aid. Though our research is focused on the U.S. military 
and its interaction with NMOs, including domestic and international NMOs, we 
believe that our ideas concerning core capabilities and competencies can be applied 
to other military organizations.  Future research investigating the capabilities of the 
militaries of other countries might lead to the development of regional capability 
maps that could assist humanitarian operations performed by militaries or NMOs in 
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